



THE CASE OF INCONSISTENT
CONSISTENCY
Josef Rohlik*
Almost everything has already been said about Soviet behavior
on the international scene, Soviet attitudes toward international
law, and the Brezhnev doctrine.1 With or without the Brezhnev
doctrine, such events as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
the blatant coercion of Poland from the birth of Solidarity in 1980
to date are not surprising; in terms of the post World War II "real-
politik" they are understandable. Soviet actions within the Soviet
"socialist bloc" easily withstand the "cost-benefit" analysis. The
Soviet view of parity of power is not limited to nuclear or conven-
tional arms; it includes any advantages or disadvantages within the
totality of relations between the superpowers. The Soviet Union
has strived for a long time for the international recognition of the
Soviet bloc as an entity. The goals of the Soviet initiatives on col-
lective security in Europe and "peaceful coexistence, '"2 which
culminated in the Helsinki Accords' and the Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
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For a discussion of the history of Soviet attitudes toward intervention and other rele-
vant concepts, see, e.g., Butler, Soviet Attitudes Toward Intervention, in LAW & CIVIL WAR
IN THE MODERN WORLD 380 (E. Moore ed. 1974); Butler, Introduction to G. TUNKIN, THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at xiii (1974); Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The
Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 209 (1981). In editing his expos6 at the Law
Professor Workshop on Coping with Internal Conflicts: Dilemmas in International Law for
publication in the proceedings of the Workshop, the author added footnotes only when he
considered it absolutely necessary for a reader knowledgeable with the problems discussed.
I Originally a Czechoslovak initiative. See M. PoToCNf and S. MYSLIL, LEGAL PRINCIPLES
OF PEACEFUL Co-ExISTENCE 10 (1969). The authors write: "The recognition of equality of the
differing social systems has become an indivisible component of the overall realistic assess-
ment of the structure and laws of development of the modern international community." Id.
at 12.
1 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8826, GENERAL FOREIGN POL-
ICY SERIES 298 (1975).
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United Nations,4 respectively, must be viewed as having been par-
tially successful, no matter what the ultimate text of the men-
tioned documents reveals. Public opinion in the West and else-
where by and large has accepted both the existence of the Soviet
bloc and Soviet behavior within the bloc as inevitable. Further-
more, the assertion of special power prerogatives within a sphere of
influence is nothing new and is not limited, even in the post World
War II era, to the Soviet Union.5 Thus, at least from the formalis-
tic point of view, Soviet attitudes toward the bloc do not have the
appearance of a rarity limited to the USSR alone. While the prin-
ciple contained in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter re-
mains a noble goal, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will abide
by the law of the Charter within its sphere of influence before it
adopts a principled and consistent attitude toward that law
elsewhere.
The reference to "elsewhere" is, of course, a reference to Soviet
actions in Afghanistan and actions by Cuba as a Soviet proxy in
Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and others. In terms of Soviet attitudes,
it serves no useful purpose to differentiate between Soviet armed
intervention and Soviet attitudes toward armed intervention on
one hand, and Soviet use of force or attitudes toward use of force,
including aggression,6 on the other hand. If Soviet attitudes toward
recent uses of force are taken into account, as in the case of the
Falklands war and the Iran-Iraq war, what emerges is Soviet indif-
ference toward legal solutions. The largely reactive role of the So-
viet Union in the United Nations and international organizations7
and the nonchalance with which it ratified the International Cove-
nants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and
' G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
" In article 4(2) of the defunct Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty "the Parties
shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the
common defense" if "the sovereignty or political independence . . ." in the defined area "is
threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact
or situation .... " Treaty for Southeast Asia Collective Defense, done Sept. 8, 1954, 6
U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28. The Israeli intervention in Lebanon and the
election of the Lebanese President friendly to Israel in August 1982 is a most recent case in
point (this paper was edited in September 1982).
' It is understood that it may be proper, and indeed useful, to differentiate between
armed intervention and aggression, quite apart from such documents as the Definition of
Aggression Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974). As mentioned, it is believed that no such distinction is necessary in terms of
the Soviet behavior, at least not within the confines of this paper.
Soviet participation in the decolonialization process is a notable exception.
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Cultural Rights8 and with which it accepted the "Friendly Rela-
tions" resolution e in its totality suggest indifference toward not
only international law, but also toward the international law mak-
ing process. The ambivalent attitude of the Soviet Union toward
the taking of American diplomatic hostages in Iran in 1979, as evi-
denced by the Soviet refusal to support effective steps to enforce
old, well-established, and rarely violated rules of international law,
makes it impossible to cling to the proposition that compliance
with international law is seen by the Soviet Union as being in its
self-interest or of significant long term value. The following
paragraphs will attempt a cursory examination of some of the
causes of this attitude and of the goal oriented technique implicit
in the Brezhnev doctrine.
After some experiments of a jurisprudential nature in the 1920's,
the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union not only eliminated any
political dissent, but also severely punished any deviation from the
"single truth" promulgated by the center of power in Moscow. The
policy making process, i.e., the formulation of a consensus, has
been limited to a small circle of people,10 and the policy decisions
have often been motivated by purely political and ideological con-
siderations, especially by the perceived need to suppress any "left-
ist" or "rightist" deviations from the official line." The governing
of the Soviet society has been achieved through the transmittal of
orders to and their blind execution by the middle and the local
functionaries of the Communist Party. While rare popular pres-
sures may account for certain decisions by the power center, un-
doubtedly there has never been practiced in the Soviet Union any
institutionalized policy or decision making process which included
bodies constitutionally or otherwise publicly designated to partici-
pate in such a process such as the plenary sessions of the Commu-
nist Party Committees and of the Soviets (legislatures) on all
levels. For over sixty years, the Soviet society, a very closed society
0 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
* Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
10 The unanimous voting in the Plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, in the Supreme Soviet as well as in local Soviets, provides an overt example.
1 The tragic end of Soviet legal theorists Pashukanis and Stuchka provided an unmistak-
able signal of the limits of independence of thought in legal theory. Even in such a chroni-
cally depressed area of the Soviet economy as agriculture, Lysenko's "theories," now totally
discredited even in the USSR, were immune from any criticism from the 1930's through the
1950's by the grace of Stalin's decision. This is perhaps the most blatant of many examples
of decision making without any rational or factual basis.
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with virtually no ties between its population and the outside world,
has not experienced any decision making processes which would
have sought an accommodation between conflicting views and
which would have been heavily dependent upon a fact finding pro-
cess. A handful of Soviet bureaucrats who are brought up in this
system and who reach the pinnacle of power in Moscow in their
sixties is psychologically and emotionally ill-equipped to effectuate
a significant change in the system of mechanical behavior of the
vast bureaucracy, especially when the price paid by those who have
tried traditionally has been high.
Law has occupied a peculiar position in this system. The insis-
tence on the eternal validity of the general utopian dogmas of
Marxism (or Marxism-Leninism) has produced a mass of literature
in the field of social sciences which is based on dogmas and ab-
stracts from reality. The socio-economic facts are fabricated or
perverted. The dogmas that socialism and communism are the ulti-
mate and highest forms of the development of mankind and that
nationalization of the means of production eliminates exploitation
lead to the axiomatic conclusion that human relations in the so-
cialist society are most humane, just, and devoid of antagonism.
Legal rules (and theories) must appear to be humane, "progres-
sive," and palatable to the citizen as well as to the foreign ob-
server.12 The "single truth" doctrine and policy lead to literal in-
terpretation of the rules. This is a positivist approach to single
isolated rules without a positivist system. The application of law,
however, is quite another thing. The decisions of administrators
and judges on every level abstract from legal rules. The decisions
are individualized and, in court cases, often made prior to trials.
There is no effort, at least in cases with political ramifications, to
perceive a legal rule as a design to regulate identical situations at
the moment of the application of a rule. The irreconcilable tension
between the interpretation of a rule and its application is "recon-
ciled" by fabrications and perversions of facts. 13 This is not to say
that there are no legal rules to be followed or regulatory schemes
to be enforced. The point is that, in matters of importance where
the "public relations" considerations are often paramount, the em-
phasis is not on the process of drafting a legal norm, but on a polit-
"' The most vivid examples would appear to be civil rights in the Soviet Constitution or
rules governing sentencing and the correctional system.
" The system was forced on the conquered states. For a fascinating account of how this
system works in every day life, see 0. ULc, THE JUDGE IN A COMMUNIST STATE (1973).
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ical decision of the center of power which is made subsequent to
the promulgation of the norm and which may vary in identical
cases.
As every student of Soviet law knows, every Soviet legal treatise
begins with a chapter on principles permeating the field of law in
question. In the case of a domestic law, the principles include the
"leading role of the Communist Party" and the "class nature of
law." After this obligatory chapter, the chapters which follow con-
tain the positivist interpretation of rules as described above. In the
area of application of law, the principles are not used for a func-
tional analysis. As already mentioned, fabrication of facts is the
preferred method. The principles are utilized, however, in two
ways. First, they are used as a vehicle for analysis of past policies
which failed or as a justification for past disregard of law which
was so manifest and which became so widely known that the
method of fabrication of facts has become untenable and, for such
a case, has been rejected by the center of power. Second, these
principles figure prominently in the infrequent authoritative state-
ments of the First Secretary or General Secretary of the Commu-
nist Party which set a new policy with wide ranging consequences.
Such statements usually contain sentences which are literally in-
terpreted as "legal" rules.
There have not been any dramatic excesses of brutality or any
dramatic purges within the USSR since Stalin's death in 1953.'4
The regime has somewhat softened its attitude toward its citizens,
and Soviet leaders have even argued in favor of a certain decen-
tralization in the economic sphere. There does not appear to be
any certainty that the Soviet system would crumble if it allowed,
at least to some extent, for the "rule of law" as a substitute for
individualized decision making. But, the rule of law as we under-
stand it has never been a goal in the USSR. The regime functions
in the same way it has always functioned. The manner of its func-
tion is the result of the form of government, one based upon tradi-
tion and upon psychological and developmental factors of the So-
viet society, rather than the result of some grand design, at least
since the consolidation of power in the 1930's. At issue is whether
there is any reason for the Soviet State to adopt a different view
toward the international decision making process and to behave
14 The purges in the process of "destalinization" are an exception to this statement.
These purges, however, did not adversely affect the general public and met with the popular
approval.
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differently within the family of nations than it behaves at home.
To put it differently: Is there any reason to believe that the Soviet
Union would actively participate in the creation of an international
order which would reflect an accommodation of conflicting inter-
ests, with the recognition that compliance with its rules would be
of significant value? There is no question that Soviet diplomacy,
from time to time, has proved to be highly successful. There is also
no question that the Soviet Union has kept understandings or
agreements in some areas of international life, such as the nuclear
arms area. However, these instances can be as easily explained in
terms of a reaction to sheer necessity as in terms of a recognition
of a benefit arising from compliance with rules of the international
order. The Soviet Union actively participated in the development
of international law in the era of decolonialization, but Soviet ac-
tions in Afghanistan and Soviet attitudes toward Angola and Cam-
bodia, among others, certainly do not manifest adherence to the
principle that "all peoples have the right freely to determine, with-
out external interference, their political status . . . .", Taking
into account Soviet conquests before and around World War II,
the conclusion can hardly be drawn that the Soviet Union sees any
value in the family of nations composed of sovereign states. Long
term compliance with a particular rule does not suggest Soviet rec-
ognition that such rules should be complied with because of their
legal character. The Soviet kidnapping of the Czechoslovak govern-
ment during the invasion of 1968 and its transfer to Moscow, as
well as the already mentioned ambivalent attitude toward the tak-
ing of American diplomatic hostages in Iran, are cases in point.
The Soviet Union was largely isolated before World War II and
during the "cold war" of the late 1940's and the 1950's. The con-
quests before16 and during17 World War II led to the incorporation
of the conquered territories into the Soviet Union. The creation of
the Socialist community of nations in 1947 and 1948 did not result
in any cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist
states which resembled the process of seeking a consensus within
this community. In the beginning, complete Soviet control was
maintained through the use of occupation forces and thousands of
Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970),.
An example of these conquests is the territories "released" during the 1917 revolution.
,7 Other examples include the Baltic Republics, parts of the territories of Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Romania, Japan, etc.
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Soviet secret police advisers. Several international bodies devel-
oped within the Socialist community during the 1950's. These were
primarily organs of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance. There is no evidence, however, that any im-
portant decisions of these bodies were preceded by an institutional,
orderly decision making process. The TASS statement on the in-
tervention in Czechoslovakia was that "[t]he events in. . .Czecho-
slovakia were repeatedly the subject of exchanges of views between
leaders of fraternal socialist countries . . ... 18 TASS also stated
that the invading states acted in accordance with "existing con-
tractual commitments." 19 There were, indeed, "consultations"-
the letter of the Warsaw Meeting of Communist Parties,20 the so-
called Bratislava communiqu6,21 and a series of bilateral meet-
ings-but nowhere can any reference be found to an institutional
decision making process. The reference to "contractual commit-
ments" is an allusion to the "individual and collective self-defense
envisaged in treaties of alliance concluded between the fraternal
socialist countries. '22 Which treaties these are and which of their
provisions were invoked is, of course, not stated.
Until the emergence of Eurocommunism in the 1970's, the Soviet
Union's close ties with other communist parties represented a well
established area of its international relations, or more properly, the
international relations of the Soviet Communist Party. These ties
were institutionalized in Commintern, Comminform, and, later, in
the Meetings of the Representatives of Communist and Workers
Parties. In his Theory of International Law, 23 Tunkin concluded
that a socialist international law developed "by way of custom,
and, partially, by treaty. '24 He cites various declarations, pro-
nouncements, communist party programs, agreements, and state-
ments of the mentioned meetings in support of his proposition.25
Yet, it is patently obvious that the meetings of the "Communist
'8 Soviet Embassy Information Department Press Release No. 12 from the TASS News
Agency (Aug. 21, 1968) (statement on military intervention), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1283
(1968).
19 Id.
20 Pravda, July 18, 1968, at 1, translated and reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Aug. 7, 1968, at 4, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1265 (1968).
21 Pravda, Aug. 4, 1968, at 1, translated and reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Aug. 21, 1968, at 4, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1280 (1968).
22 Soviet Embassy Information Department Press Release No. 12, supra note 18.
13 G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974).
2, Id. at 432.
15 Id. at 427-47.
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and Workers Parties" had served only one purpose: to uncondi-
tionally support the Soviet Union. When this purpose was no
longer being served, i.e. with the emergence of Eurocommunism
following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union
was faced with the need of working toward accommodation and
compromise within the Communist movement, but instead re-
sorted to condemnations. The current split with the Italian Com-
munist Party is a case in point. Tunkin, justifying the right of the
Soviet Union to intervene in socialist countries, is quick to point
out the "special" role the Soviet Union has in safeguarding the
survival of Soviet style regimes. 26 The Soviet Union has viewed the
socialist countries and communist parties elsewhere as entities
which are totally subordinate to Moscow. Consequently, the inter-
national communist movement and the socialist community have
not provided a reason for Moscow to behave any differently on the
international scene than they do at home. Quite to the contrary,
the socialist countries serve as proof of the proverbial pudding:
whenever a country has resorted to insubordination it has been
successfully "eaten." As for the communist movement, the party
outside the socialist world which dares defy the orthodoxy is sim-
ply discarded by Moscow.
Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet interpretation of
international law followed the conflict of positivist interpretation
of rules2 7 and fabrication or perversion of facts at the moment of
application of the rules. As Butler points out in his Introduction to
Tunkin's Theory of International Law, Tunkin himself had advo-
cated the concept of single international law. 28 Authors from other
socialist countries have taken an identical position. One such au-
thor specifically addressed the question of collective security and
argued that any such system had to be necessarily universal.2 a
While Nicholas Rostow is correct in seeing elements of the
Brezhnev doctrine in the Soviet justification of the invasion of
Hungary in 1956,30 and while Tunkin, as perhaps the authoritative
source, concurs in an ex post facto opinion,31 the legal justification
26 Id. at 435, 440.
, In the area of intervention see, e.g., Butler, Soviet Attitudes Toward Intervention,
supra note 1.
28 Butler, Introduction to G. TUNKIN, supra note 1, at xix.
Outrata, Mezindrodneprdvni Ochrana Bezpecnosti Stdtu, 1 STUDIE Z MEZINARODNIHO
PRAVA 23, 43 (1955).
20 Rostow, supra note 1, at 224-25.
2" G. TUNKIN, supra note 23, at 435.
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at the time of the invasion rested on the old international law doc-
trine of invitation as a permissible justification for intervention.
The Brezhnev doctrine, as announced in connection with the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia 2 and reiterated in connection with the
still current Polish situation," is important to the extent that it
provides a foundation for the assertion of the existence of a new,
socialist international law34 representing a higher form of interna-
tional law governing the societies in the highest stage of the devel-
opment of mankind.35 The basis of Tunkin's advocacy of this new
socialist international law is quite simple. The slogan of the 1848
Communist Manifesto, "proletarians of all countries unite," be-
came the basis of relations within the entire communist movement
and thus became the principle of proletarian internationalism. 6
The concomitant legal principle of socialist internationalism in-
cludes the principle of comradely mutual assistance which "in-
cludes the right of each state of the world system of socialism to
obtain assistance from other socialist countries and, at the same
time, the obligation of each socialist state to render assistance to
other socialist countries. ' ' 37 Tunkin undoubtedly implies the obli-
gation to render assistance does not depend upon a request. Since,
as mentioned above, the socialist international law represents a
"higher form" of international law, it is more progressive and the
law of the United Nations Charter is irrelevant. The law of the
32 See, e.g., Soviet Embassy Information Department Press Release No. 12, supra note 18.
"The fraternal countries firmly and resolutely counterpose their unbreakable solidarity to
any threat from the outside. Nobody will ever be allowed to wrest a single link from the
community of socialist states." See also Letter from the Permanent Representative of the
USSR to President of the Security Council, 23 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept.) at 136, U.N.
Doc. S/8759 (1968), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1288, 1289 (1968). "The events in Czechoslovakia
are a matter that concerns the Czechoslovak people and the States of the Socialist Commu-
nity which are bound by appropriate mutual obligations."
" See U.S. Dept. of State, Chronicle of Public Soviet and Soviet-Proxy Involvement in
the Polish Crisis, July 1980-Nov. 1981 (Dec. 1981) (unpublished press release); see also id.
Appendix, at 1 (Brezhnev's speech to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, translated from the February 24, 1981 edition of Pravda).
S4 See G. TUNKIN, supra note 23, at 427-47.
" As to the existence of the new international law, see supra note 24 and accompanying
text. The concept was embraced by other socialist authors. See, e.g., M. PoTocNf,
MEZINARODNi PRAvo VmEwJNt 32-43 (1972) (a Czechoslovak textbook on international law).
Interestingly, the author writes: "Examples given in accordance with the principle of inter-
national assistance include ...the collective assistance of the Soviet Union, Poland, Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria to the Czechoslovak people in 1968 ....
Id. at 41 (translation from the Czech original by the author).
" G. TUNKIN, supra note 23, at 4.
37 Id. at 435.
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Charter applies only between non-communist states and between
the communist states and other states as the law governed by the
principles of "peaceful coexistence.""8 What we have, then, is a
new subject in the international community, the socialist commu-
nity, which comes within the literally interpreted protection of ar-
ticle 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations.3 9 With the period
of decolonialization virtually over and with Moscow reserving the
right to determine membership in the socialist community, there is
a new justification for future Soviet interventions and aggressions.
As Rostow points out, Afghanistan is an example.40
One interesting aspect of Tunkin's work may foreshadow future
Soviet advocacy in international law. Tunkin's Theory of Interna-
tional Law is replete with references to "principles." The
"Friendly Relations" resolution,4' which, as mentioned above, was
the result of the Soviet-Czechoslovak peaceful coexistence initia-
tive, is likewise structured on "principles." Tunkin refers to the
fundamental principles of international law and their modification
during the period of "Coexistence."' 2 With respect to these funda-
mental principles, Tunkin refers to several socialist authors.'3 In-
terestingly, several socialist international lawyers, particularly the
late V. Outrata whose work is the first one cited by Tunkin,"' ac-
cepted, albeit with modifications, the system (as opposed to the
individual principles) of the fundamental principles of interna-
tional law suggested by a prominent British jurist, Georg
Schwarzenberger.' 5  The fundamental principles which
Id. at 34-86.
Compare U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 with Letter from the Permanent Representative
of the USSR to President of the Security Council, supra note 32.
0 Rostow, supra note 1, at 236-38.
4' Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
11 G. TUNKIN, supra note 23, at 49-87.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 49, note 1.
"" Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 1 RECUEIL DES
COURS 195 (1955); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
72-107 (1965); G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-36
(1976). The seven fundamental principles are: sovereignty, recognition, consent, good faith,
freedom of the seas, international responsibility, and self-defense. The MANUAL distin-
guishes principles and fundamental principles which are not binding from rules which are
binding. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra, at 34. The tests applied in their selection
are: "(1) They must be exceptionally significant for international law; (2) They must stand
from others by covering a relatively wide range of issues and fall without artificiality under
one and the same heading; (3) They must either form an essential part of any known system
of international law or be so characteristic of existing international law that if they were
[Vol. 13:355
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Schwarzenberger uses in his system of international law are ab-
stractions from the multitude of rules governing a particular sub-
ject.46 He is careful to point out that the fundamental principles
are not binding per se, and that the focus of the search must be to
identify binding rules. Outrata specifically accepts this restrictive
concept.47 It should be pointed out that both Schwarzenberger and
Outrata differentiate between principles or general principles and
fundamental principles. The difference is in the degree of abstrac-
tion. Tunkin proceeds quite differently in dealing with his princi-
ples. He de-emphasizes individual rules, mixes some rules with po-
litical statements and conclusions, reaches a "principle," and
applies it as a super-rule to the exclusion of the existing rules. His
method appears to be one of generalization and abstraction. How-
ever, it is nothing more than the posing of political postulates. The
process is reversed. The validity of a rule is measured by its com-
patibility with the super-rule.
Soviet aggressions, armed interventions, and other types of na-
ked coercion (e.g., Poland) have been characterized by two ele-
ments: refusal to cooperate with international organizations and
fabrication of facts. In general, the Soviet Union in its legal advo-
cacy has resorted either to espousing existing legal theories as they
might have fit the fabricated facts (e.g., self determination, invita-
tion, or self-defense), or to groundless abstractions based on the
authoritative political pronouncements of Soviet leadership. The
author's thesis is that Soviet participation in the international law
making process in the area of intervention and aggression has been
characterized by the same attitude that characterizes Soviet do-
mestic legislation: law making is an exercise in public relations.
Admittedly, recent Soviet armed involvement, direct or by
proxy, has been limited to either socialist states or to states with a
significant Marxist faction able to either form a government (e.g.,
Ethiopia) or to appear to be able to govern (e.g., Afghanistan and
Angola). Other Soviet efforts to establish client states have in-
cluded the widely accepted practice of supplying arms to bona fide
revolutionary movements, as in Nicaragua. Among the attempts at
ignored there would be a danger of losing sight of a characteristic feature of contemporary
international law." Id. at 35.
40 Schwarzenberger, supra note 45, at 195, 201, 203.
4 Outrata, K Pojmu Obecnjch a Zdhladnich Zdsad Mezinlrodniho Pr(va, 5 CZECHOSLO-
VAK J. OF INT'L L., 177 (1961). His fundamental principles are: sovereignty, good faith, pro-
tection of the peace, obligatory co-operation of states in economic, social, and cultural mat-
ters, and legal regulation of armed conflict. Id. at 186-88.
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establishing client states which have been successfully resisted are
Somalia and Syria. These efforts sometimes contain comical as-
pects (e.g., "switching" between Iraq and Iran).
Soviet general attitudes are determinative of Soviet behavior in
particular cases. Therefore, it might be useful to look at Soviet at-
titudes toward one international crisis involving the use of force
which was not only outside of the Soviet sphere of interest, but
which seemed to be devoid of ideological implications for the So-
viet Union. The Falklands crisis is an example of Soviet indiffer-
ence to legal solutions and international cooperation even though
the support for law would not have entailed any discernible politi-
cal risks.
The grain embargo imposed by President Carter on the Soviet
Union4 s brought about increased Soviet purchases of agricultural
products from Argentina and, consequently, certain rapproche-
ment between the USSR and Argentina. Yet, there had been no
evidence of any political cooperation between the Argentinian mili-
tary junta and the Soviet Union which would have signified that
Argentina figured into Soviet global strategy in any way, or more
specifically, into Soviet attempts to influence events in Latin
America. In fact, prior to the Falklands crisis there had been a sig-
nificant improvement in United States-Argentina relations brought
about by a change in United States policy toward military regimes
accused of human rights violations. Furthermore, the decision of
the beribboned generals to invade the Falklands was arguably in-
fluenced by domestic difficulties in Argentina. If this were true, a
successful annexation of the Falklands could have led to the stabi-
lization of the political situation in Argentina. Such a goal would
not be consistent with the Soviet's Latin American strategy. On
the other hand, 1982 was to be the year of cooperation between the
Soviet Union and Western Europe on the natural gas pipeline
which was widely opposed in the United States.49 The ultimate
fate of the project was by no means certain in April 1982. It could
at least be theorized that Moscow was strongly interested in the
pipeline and was not particularly anxious to do anything which
" Imposed in January 1980. Restriction on the Export of Agricultural Commodities and
Products to the USSR, 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 386,
399). The embargo was removed by President Reagan in April 1981.
"' The proposition that the pipeline would lead to West European dependency on the
USSR cannot be viewed as emanating from the Reagan administration alone. See, e.g.,
Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1980, § D, at 6, col. 5.
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might have caused a deterioration of its relations with Western
Europe.
Apart from Argentina's claims which were supported only by a
few states like Panama, the Falklands situation was manifestly de-
void of the usual decolonialization issues. The historical links be-
tween Argentina and the Falklands were almost nonexistent, at
least when abstracted from the succession into Spanish claims.
There was no national identity of population, no "liberation move-
ment," and no sufficient territorial link. Most importantly, there
was no militant Latin American sentiment in favor of Argentina
because of a number of territorial disputes with her neighbors, and
there was no unanimity within the developing countries on the
matter.50 The Soviet delegate in the Security Council "accused
Britain of stubbornly opposing decolonialization" 51 and abstained
in the vote on Security Council Resolution 502 of April 3, 1982,
which demanded cessation of hostilities and Argentinian with-
drawal, and which called on both parties to seek a diplomatic solu-
tion." As the crisis progressed, the Soviet Union sided with
Argentina.
Whether the unanimity of the Permanent Members of the Se-
curity Council backed by strong sanctions under chapter VII of the
Charter would have averted the war is a matter of pure specula-
tion. But, where else should cooperation be achieved and the law
upheld than in a case of a textbook aggression in which there ap-
pear to be no strong political reasons for supporting the aggressor?
The question may be posed whether it is desirable that the collec-
tive security system of the Charter should work. Whatever the an-
swer may be, in a year marked by war in the South Atlantic, a
massive bombing of Beirut, the Iran-Iraq war, the Cuban backed
border war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and continued Soviet
military action in Afghanistan, there is an urgent need to establish
some consensus, some "rules of the game," and to create a climate
of pressure to follow such rules."' In the Falklands crisis the Soviet
Union could have cooperated with other members of the interna-
tional community on the basis of a treaty it negotiated, the United
Nations Charter, and the rules of a number of General Assembly
50 N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
61 Id.
52 S.C. Res. 502, U.N. SCOR Supp. - (-) at -, U.N. Doc. No. S/- (1982), reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 629 (1982).
53 Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
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resolutions which it helped to draft. Moscow did not veto the April
3, 1982 Security Council Resolution, but once again manifested a
strong indifference to law, the law making process, and interna-
tional cooperation in political matters.
There is no doubt that the Soviet attitude will not change over-
night. Those who believe that the Soviet Union and its empire will
somehow crumble from within because of economic and civil rights
pressures are not only ignorant of the Soviet system of governing,
but are also disregarding the cold war experience. An isolation
more severe than the present one was not effective then, and
switching between individual embargoes will not work now. The
population of the empire has gone through worse times and has
psychologically accepted the fact that defiance ends in tragedy and
a reversal of economic and civil rights gains.5 4 In order to influence
Soviet behavior, it will be necessary to establish or re-establish
"rules of the game"-an international order-and to "teach" Mos-
cow to participate. The Soviet Union can be taught through pres-
sure from sources other than the West and through a genuine and
long term cooperation with the West which would withstand occa-
sional frictions, even of a severe nature. It may take a few more
Afghanistan-type invasions to prompt the developing countries to
generate a concerted pressure on Moscow. To generate such a pres-
sure will also require an acceptable behavior by states closely
linked to the West, and especially to the United States. That the
United States and the Soviet Union could strive for cooperation
was demonstrated by Kennedy-Khruschev personal diplomacy and
the Nixon-Kissinger attempt to establish a framework for coopera-
tion. When the natural gas pipeline has been built, the United
States will finally learn that embargoes lead nowhere; neither do
actions such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment.5
There is one area in which United States-Soviet Union coopera-
tion in particular, and international cooperation in general, may
prove to be not only imperative, but also a good beginning for ef-
forts to draw Moscow into the habit of approaching seriously the
establishment of an international consensus and the adherence to
agreed upon rules. It has been feared that such states as Libya
may obtain nuclear weapons. It should be clear by now that nu-
clear weapons might pose an unacceptable danger in the hands of
Cf. Kamm, The Graying of Prague, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 48,
col. 1.
"' Trade Act of 1974, § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1976).
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Argentinian generals and others. The Permanent Members of the
Security Council must reach an agreement on how to deal with the
problem of the nuclear capability of states which have not yet pub-
licly acknowledged possession of these weapons. The future of the
world may well depend on the willingness of the United States and
the Soviet Union not to distinguish between friends and adversa-
ries and not to yield to the political pressures of the moment in
dealing with this problem.

